NEWS & UPCOMING EVENTS
"Nietzsche on mimicry, alliance, and the phantasy of empathy," paper accepted for Symposium presentation at the 2021 APA Central Division meeting, to be held February 24-27, 2021 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
In this essay, I am developing a psychological theory of empathy, which I call "representational emotional knowing", that incorporates Friedrich Nietzsche's middle-period writings.
To learn more about my research on Schopenhauer, please see my blog post titled "The legacy of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics," which will appear on The Official Blog of the American Philosophical Association.
Here’s the teaser:
"The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. As a result of this prevailing tendency in Schopenhauer scholarship, many have become so accustomed to treating his philosophy as in need of substantial correction and reconstruction. I do not particularly agree with this interpretative strategy, but it reflects the mainstream scholarly consensus, namely that Schopenhauer’s philosophical legacy, without his metaphysical vocabulary, might be maintained in the contemporary world. In this blog post, I briefly outline the major points of my research, without elaborating on the philosophical technicalities, and explain why I take issue with certain interpretive routes that have been taken in Schopenhauer scholarship concerning his metaphysical system."
The link to the post is as follows:
"Nietzschean Compassion," paper accepted for Symposium presentation at the 2021 APA Eastern Division meeting, to be held January 4-7, 2021 in New York City, New York.
Abstract. Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (commonly rendered as ‘compassion’). He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “my kind of compassion” (KSA 11, 36 ) or “our compassion” (JGB 225). Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem–that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I, however, suggest that the best way to resolve this apparent tension is to recognize that ‘his’ compassion is not compassion at all.