Vasfi O. Özen

D.Phil. Candidate in Philosophy and Instructor at The University of Kansas; Andrew W. Mellon Coordinator of Academic Programs at The Spencer Museum of Art.

WELCOME TO MY WEBSITE---I am not on any non-academic social media medium.

Please feel free to get in touch to find out more about my work and research projects.

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For access to my selected publications, please click on the "Contact" button below, and you will be directed to my Academia.edu or ResearchGate profile.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS                                                                  

NIETZSCHE'S COMPASSION

Forthcoming in Nietzsche-Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche-Forschung

Abstract. Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (commonly rendered as ‘compassion’).  He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “our compassion” and contrasts it with “your compassion” (Beyond Good and Evil § 225). Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem–that he does not condemn compassion entirely. To the contrary, Nietzsche allows for and encourages healthy expressions of compassion, which are active, not only increasing one’s sense of psychological power, but more so modifying and bringing about beneficial (and creative) changes to one’s surroundings. I disagree and contend that even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he regards the nature of all compassion to be fundamentally bad. Furthermore, I suggest that Nietzsche’s discussion on different forms of compassion have significant implications for achieving greatness and meaning in life. More specifically, I argue that, for Nietzsche, ‘our compassion’, however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into ‘co-suffering’ with others, which in turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. I also argue that although Nietzsche objects to compassion, he approves of a form of what feminist theorists might now call ‘anticipatory empathy’. Even though a large body of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion, his understanding of a non-compassionate response to suffering is, in my view, rather overlooked and should receive more attention. I believe my reconstruction of Nietzsche’s discussion of his brand of compassion opens up many possible avenues of research on his moral psychology and ethical thought.

THE AMBIGUITY IN SCHOPENHAUER’S DOCTRINE OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF

Forthcoming in The Review of Metaphysics: A Philosophical Quarterly

Abstract. The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. Schopenhauer borrows the term ‘thing-in-itself’ from Immanuel Kant, who uses it to refer to a reality that is distinct from what appears to us, and hence unknowable. Despite the fact that several interpretations have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. Unlike the other interpretations, the interpretation that I offer here distinguishes between three distinct and mutually incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself. I argue that it is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of Schopenhauer’s position, but also not worth trying, because such an endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth of thought that Schopenhauer’s works offer.

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"Nietzsche on mimicry, alliance, and the phantasy of empathy," paper accepted for Symposium presentation at the 2021 APA Central Division meeting, to be held February 24-27, 2021 in New Orleans, Louisiana.

In this essay, I am developing a psychological theory of empathy, which I call "representational emotional knowing", that incorporates Friedrich Nietzsche's middle-period writings.

To learn more about my research on Schopenhauer, please see my blog post titled "The legacy of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics," which will appear on The Official Blog of the American Philosophical Association.

Here’s the teaser:

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"The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. As a result of this prevailing tendency in Schopenhauer scholarship, many have become so accustomed to treating his philosophy as in need of substantial correction and reconstruction. I do not particularly agree with this interpretative strategy, but it reflects the mainstream scholarly consensus, namely that Schopenhauer’s philosophical legacy, without his metaphysical vocabulary, might be maintained in the contemporary world. In this blog post, I briefly outline the major points of my research, without elaborating on the philosophical technicalities, and explain why I take issue with certain interpretive routes that have been taken in Schopenhauer scholarship concerning his metaphysical system."

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The link to the post is as follows:

"Nietzschean Compassion," paper accepted for Symposium presentation at the 2021 APA Eastern Division meeting, to be held January 4-7, 2021 in New York City, New York.

Abstract. Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (commonly rendered as ‘compassion’). He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “my kind of compassion” (KSA 11, 36 [7]) or “our compassion” (JGB 225). Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem–that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I, however, suggest that the best way to resolve this apparent tension is to recognize that ‘his’ compassion is not compassion at all.